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THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.,

§ 1. "To be a witness is a personal privilege and one of the distinguishing rights of a free citizen, which he has a deep interest to
preserve." 2 But this, like other relative rights, can be enjoyed in
such manner only, and is subject to such limitations, as the law
prescribes. Accordingly the laws of most civilized nations have recognized certain defined circumstances and relations, tending more or
less in their nature to bias the judgment and seduce the integrity
of witnesses, as sufficient cause for excluding their testimony altogether.3 Persons thus excluded are said to be incompetent.
'GENERAL SYLLABUS.
Incompetency.
L From a state of mind.'
(1.) As, from want of religious beliefs, 8 to 12.
(2.) As, from immaturity of mind, J 12 to 18.
(8.) As, from derangement or weakness of mind, 13 to 15.
(4.) As, from infamy, J 15 to 21.
II. From a relation.
(1:) As,party creating an interest in the suit, 22 to 36. (Except. 28 to 36.)
(2.) Not as party creating intefesLin the suit, 336 to 46. (Except. 51 to 56.)
(3.)Creating an interest in the record, 46 to 59. (Except. 51 to 55.)
(4.) As husband or wife of a party or person interested, 59 to 65. (Except.
64.
zPer Kirkpatrick, Ch.J., Den vs. Vancleve, 2 Southard's (N. J.) R. 652.
3 Heinn. Elem Jar. Civ. sec. ord. Pand. 138, 141 ; Mills' Hiet. MahommedanVOL. VIII-1
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§ 2. Concisely to show what, according to the common law of
the United States, constitutes such incompetency, the manner in
which it must be proved, and the means by which it may be removed, is the purpose of this dissertation.'
§ 3. The subject will obviously admit of convenient discussion
under two general heads: (I.) Incompetency by reason of the
state of mind of the person offered as a witness. Of this kind of
incompetency it may be remarked that it is strictly personal, and
will render the person inadmissible in every case, in whatever tribunal the suit may be instituted, and whoever may be the parties.
It is conceived it cannot be waived, 2 and in its nature, it is incapable of release. (II.) Incompetency by reason of the relation the
person offered sustains to a party or person interested, or to the
judgment to be rendered. This relation does not accurately constitute a personal incompetency, much less a general one; for the
person may he competent to' testify in any other case; but is rather
a cause from which the law conclusively presumes such a bias as to
render it improbable that the person, if admitted to testify, would
tell the truth, and he is therefore excluded. In most cases, this

ism, ch. 5, p. 359; Gentoo code (by Halhead,) ch. 3, 5, 8, p. 124, et seq. But
see on the subject of competency under the Hindoo law, I Macnaughten's Hindoo
Law, p. 242 to 250, where the subject is treated at length, and the distinctions and
reasons for the most part are whimsical and absurd, if not disgusting.
'All persons are presumed to be competent; and when this is the fact, their
rights are clear and require no discussion. It is the cases of those who are incompetent that we are to examine. Perhaps, then, the title "incompetency of witnesses," would be preferable; as it would certainly more accurately designate the
purpose and nature of the discussion usually found under the title ", competency of
vitnesses."
2 I have not found any authority which determines how far it would be the duty
of the court to go towards excluding a witness who did not understand the nature
-of an oath, or was idiotic, or insane, or infamous, provided the parties made no
objection to his testimony. It is conceived, however, that a due regard to the purity
of public justice would require the judge to exclude such a person. 1 Phillips
Evid. p 2, 3, 7, 8, post, 4; 1 Greenleaf Evid. 365 to 370. It may be a more
questionable conclusion, however, in the case of infamy, but in any of the other
cases it would be but mockery to administer an oath.
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species of incompetency may be waived,' and in nearly all, released
or otherwise removed.2
§ 4. In all the cases in which the law declares a person to be
incompetent, it founds its decision upon an assumed probability,
supposed to be sustained by experience and to be justified by sound
philosophy that if the testimony of the person excluded were re3
ceived, it would tend more to establish falsehood than truth. In
this department, as in all others, the law seeks general rules,-as
necessary to attain that cheapness, dispatch and certainty in the
administration of justice, without which courts would be of little
utility.4 The law does not assume that all those it declares incomI

This would seem to constitute a marked distinction between this species of

incompetency and the other, though I should speak very cautiously, as I have seen
it nowhere noticed. Donaldson vs. Taylor, 8 Pick. 390; 1 Greenleaf Evid. 421,
post, 55; See People vs. McNair, 21 Wend. 608.
9 See post, a 57, 58.
'3 1 Phillips Ev. 2; Phillips and Amos Ev. 3; 1 Greenleaf Ev. 326, 327.
It seems requisite at this point, in order to mark the limits of this dissertation, to
note the distinction between persons held incompetent and those held "inadmissible on grounds of public policy." I have nowhere been able to find it intelligibly
stated; though the most approved elementary writers treat these two classes of' excluded persons under separate heads. Perhaps the distinction may be found to. be
this: Persons who are excluded on the ground that, if. admitted, their evidence
would probably be untrue, and therefore mislead the judge or jury, are said to be
incompetent. 1.Phillips Ev.2; 1 Greenleaf E . 326, 327. Persons who are excluded on the ground that whether their statements be true or false, to allow them
to give evidence would be too hazardous to private happiness and public well-being
are said to be "inadmissible on grounds of public policy." 1 Starkie Ev.70;
1 Phillips Ev.177; 1 Greenleaf Ev.326.
There are cases in which witnesses have been excluded on such mixed grounds
of incompetency and public policy as to render it difficult to decide which was the
prevailing reason. 1 Greenl. Ev.334; Barkie vs. Dixie, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 264;
Pedley vs. Wellesley; 3 0. & P. 565; Bridge vs. Armour et al. 6 Howard's U. S. R.
91; Stein vs. Bowman et al, 13 Peters' S.' C.'Rep. 209. The whole doctrine of
incompetency or inadmissibility, as it applies to the relation of married persons, is
of this doubtful class. Perhaps it would not be difficult to refer nearly every case
in which married persons have been rejected to the rule of ",inadmissibility on
grounds of public policy." However, from deference to high authority, I have
included it in this dissertation. 1 Greenleaf Ev. 236.
1 Phillips Er. pp. 1, 2, 3; 1 Greenleaf Er. a 326, 327.
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petent cannot, or indee'd that they would not, in numerous instances,
tell the truth; but that in a majority of cases they would not do so.
And that, in the hurry, fatigue and excitement of public trials, it
would be dangerous to impose upon the jury, or the court, the
difficult labor of selecting the little truth which might be mingled
with a large mass of ingenious and designing falsehood.1
§ 5. To avoid repetition, it may be observed here, that in every
instance in which it can arise, the question of competency is preliminary in its nature, and is to be determined by the court alone.2
When the decision of the question of interest involves intricate
questions of fact, the judge may, in his discretion, take the opinion
of the jury upon them.' If the judge, in deciding a question of
competency, incidentally decides a question of fact, his decision in
no manner binds the jury,4 but upon the question of competency it
is conclusive upon them ;5 but if his interest is a question of fact, the
6
jury may decide it for themselves.
1 Greenleaf Ev.

326.

This rule of law has been severely, and, I think, justly

condemned. 2 Taylor Evid. H 948, 949; 1 Phillips Evid. 1, 2, 3, 43, 44; Act
3 and 4 Will. 4, ch. 42 (1833); 6 & 7 Vict. ch. 85; 1 Gilbert Ev. by Lofft, p. 223
and 224; American Law Magazine, No. 6, July, (1844,) p. 339 to 350; 3 Am.
Jur. p. 20; 6 Am. Jar. p. 18.
425; Seymour vs. Beach, 11 Conn. 275, 281;
21 Phillips Ev. 1; Greeleaf Ev.
Donaldson vs. Taylor, 8 Pick, 390; M. & R. 20, 99 ;' Harris vs. Wilson, 7 Wend.
57. But see Coleman vs. Wolcott, 4 Day, 388; Den vs. Vancleve,: 2 Southard's R.
652. If the witness disavows all interest, and nothing appears to the contrary, the
court should allow his testimony to go to the jury. Stranbridge vs. Spane, 8 Ala.
R. 820, 1 Taylor Ev. 21. But if the witness be of tender years, and a party requests the court to examine him as to his understanding of the nature of an oath,
it is not sufficient for the court to reply, that he is satisfied; he must examine the
child, as requested. The People vs. McNair, 21 Wend. 608.
'Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 2, (n). But see supplement to 2d Part Cowen &
Hill's Notes to Phil. Ev. 1501 ; Witter vs. Latham, 12 Conn. 20. But the party may
insist upon the witness being examined as to his interest. The People vs. McNair,
21 Wend. 608; Cochet vs. Dinon, 4 McCord, 311.
4
Ross vs. Gould, 5 Greenl. R. 204; Walker vs. Sawyer, 13 N. Hamp. 191.
5 Supplement to 2d Part Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phil. Ev. p. 1501 ; Cook vs. Mix,
11 Conn. 432. But see Walker vs. Sawyer, 13 N. H. 191; Aimstrong vs. Graham,
4 Barr, 142.
6 Walker vs. Sawyer, 13 N. Hamp. 191. The decision on the question of fact does
not bind the jury, only on the question of competency.
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§ 6. The law presumes every person offered as a witness, in the
absence of all evidence tar the contrary, to be competent ;1 and devolves upon the party objecting to his testimony the burden of
2
showing, by positive affirmative evidence, that he is incompetent.
§ 7. Having disposed of these general principles of our subject,
we are prepared to enter more into details, and shall consider,
first, incompetency by reason of the state of mind of the person
offered as a .witness. Under this head may be embraced persons
incompetent: (1.) From want of the requisite religious belief, or, what
amounts to the same thing,3 from insensibility to the obligations of
an oath. (2.) From immaturity of mind. (3.) From derangement
or weakness of mind. (4.) From infamy. Of these in their order;
and,
§ 8." (1) Of incompetency from the want of the requisite religious
belief. The law permits no person to testify in a court of justice
I1 Phillips Ev. p. 86. The presumption is the same in all cases, but the
methods of proving incompetency are not the same. Den vs. Vancleve, 2 Southard's
R.. 652. If the objection be infancy, and the witness be shown to be under fourteen years of age, the presumption of competency no longer exists, and the court
-will, upon inspection, decide upon his competency. 1 Southard, 672; Jackson vs.
Gridley, 18 Johns. 98; 1 Greenl. Ev. 867. If the objection be want of religious belief, the party objecting cannot interrogate the witness, but must prove the
witness' declarations. United States vs. Kennedy et al. 3 McLean's R. 175; Perry's
Case, 3 Gratt. 632, 1 Greenl. Ev. 370. So if the objection be infamy, the objecting party must prove it by the production of the record of conviction. Rex vs.
Carsinon, 8 East, 77; Cowper R. 3; 1 Phillips Ev. 19; State vs. Valentine, 7
Iredell R. 225. If interest be objected, it must be strictly proved. Dodge vs.
Rundell, 13 Conn. 169; Adams' Adm. vs. Barrett, 3 Kelly R. 277; Cornell vs.
Vanartsdeln, 4 Barr's AL.354; Phillips Ev.p. 86. But see Fagin vs. Cooley, 17
Ohio, 44. If the objection be interest in the record, it must be made to appear.
Post, 49. If that they are deaf and dumb, this must be made to appear, upon
inspection, by the court. Den vs. Vancleve, 2 Southard's R. 652 ; 1 Greenlf. Ev.
366 ; Phillips' Ev.4. If the objection be, that the person is deranged or imbecile,
it mus*t be proved by the party objecting. 3 Br. Ch. Cases, 443; Peaslee vs.
lobbins, 3 Met. R. 163; Hir vs. Whittemore, 4 Met. IL. 545; 1 Colliuson on Lunacy, 55; 1 Hale's P. C. 38. If that he is intoxicated, it must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court. Gibbert vs. Shindle, 15 Serg. & Rawle. 235.
21 Phillips Ev.p. 86; Lerers vs. Vanbuskirk, 4 Barr, 309; Allen vs. Adams, 17
Conn. 69; also, Jones vs. Brownfield, 2 Barr, 55. But see Fagin vs. Cooley, 17
Ohio, 44.
3'1 Greenlf. Ev. J 368, 369; 1 Phillips Ev.pp. 7-10.

THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

until he has taken a solemn -oath to speak the truth.1 The administration of this oath presupposes that the witness believes in the
existence and providence of God; and that future punishment will be
the consequence of perjury.' The object of the oath is to cause the
witness to reflect upon the solemn relation he sustains to the Ruler
of the Universe, and the awful guilt of deliberate perjury, at the very
moment when the mind is dwelling on these relations. It is in such
a belief, when invigorated by the sanction of such an oath, that the
law places its confidence that the witness will utter the truth.3
Hence, in the theory of the law, if the person offered as a witness
does not believe in the existence of God, and that He will punish
perjury, it would be but solemn mummery 4 to administer the oath;
and he is, therefore, consistently held incompetent. It is not however, indispensable to competency, that the person believe that the
punishment of perjury will be inflicted in the next world;' it will
be sufficient if he has a religious sense of accountability to God, and
believes that He will punish in this world the commission of perjury. 6 All persons who have not such belief, are justly said (in the
12 Roll. Ab. 686; Omichund vs. Barker, Willes R. 55; 1 Phil. Ev. 7; 1
Starkie Ev. 22; 1 Greenlf. Xv. 368. 2 Taylor on Ev. pp. 915, 916, 917. But
see 2 Taylor on Ev. p. 916, 1010, note (m), and 6 and 7 Vict. c. 22, which is an
exception.
2 Wakefield vs. Ross, 5 Mason, 18; 1 Atk. R. 48 ; 1 Starkie Ev. p. 22; 1 Phill.
Ev. p. 8; 1 Greenlf. a 328, 365, 868; 1st Part Cowen & Hill's Notes to 1 Phillips
notes 53 and 55, p. 62, 63; 2 Taylor on Evid. p. 918. When the oath has been
omitted, see 1 Ry. & Moo. C. C. 86; 5 Johns. 129; 6 Greenlf. R. 72; Com. vs.
Norton, 14 Pick. 326.
' 1 Greenlf. Evid. H 328, 365, 369; Rex vs. Williams, 7 C. & P. 320.
4 2 Taylor on Evid. p. 918.
60michund vs. Barker, Willes, 545 ; 1st Part Cowen & Hill's Notes to 1 Phillips
,v. 53, 55, p. 62-3; Supplement to 2d Part, ibid, p. 1503; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 12;
Phebe vs. Prince, Atkins, 131.
6 The authorities above cited, and United States vs. Kennedy et al. 3 McLean's
R. 175; Jones vs. Harris, 1 Strcbhart, 160. (Religious belief is notinquired into in
Virginia. Perry's case, 3 Gratt. 632) ; Wakefield v. Boss, 5 Mason, 18; Butts vsSwartout, 2 Cowen, 431; Hanscom vs Hanscom, 15 Mass. 184; contra Atwood
vs. Wilton, 7 Conn. 66. In Maine, incompetency on the ground of religious belief
is removed by statute. Smith vs. Coffin, 6 Shepley. 157; Noble vs. People, Breese,
29. In England, though recent legislation has removed several causes of incompetency, this one is retained, and the latest elementary writer on the subject thinks
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legal sense) to be insensible to the obligation of an oath, because
they are incapable of feeling the influences which the law considers
as alone sufficient to confer upon conscience the power of enforcing
the utterance of truth.
§ 9. Accordingly, however much the person offered may consider
himself bound to speak the truth, from regard to the good repute
of himself, his family or his friends, or to the well being of society;
or however much he may be controlled by fear of the punishment he
might suffer should he commit perjury, he is, nevertheless, incompetent.' Atheists, and all those who disbelieve in the existence of a
2
God who will punish perjury, are therefore incompetent.
§ 10. As to the form of the oath, it miy be observed, that if it
should appear that the 'witne'ss professes some other than the Christian 'religion, and if his belief involve the legal requisites to competency, the court may inquire of him as to the form of administering
the oath to persons of his faith, and it shall be administered in that
form. 3

The court may inquire in any case of a witness, either

before the oath is administered or afterwards, 'hether the oath in
the usual form is binding upon his conscience.4 But he must not
it wisely retained; 2 Taylor on Evid. p. 91 8 , 1014. In Massachusetts, disbelief of
a future state of existence goes only to the credibility of the witness; Hanscom vs.
Hanscom, 15 Mass. R. 184; Commonwealth vs. Burrell, 16 Pick. 153. But in
Connecticut, one who disbelieves in a future state is not competent; Atwood vs.
Wilton, 7 Conn. R. 66; 1 Phillips Ev. 11.
I1 Phillips Ev. p. 10; Ruston's case, i Leach, 455; 1 Greenlf. Ev. J 368.
2 2 Taylor on Ev. p. 918,
1014; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 10; 1 Starkie Ev. 22;
Supplement to 2d part Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillip's Ev. p. 1503; Curtis vs.
Strong, 4 Day, 51; Jackson vs. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98; U. S. vs. Kennedy et al., 3
McLean, 175; Jones vs. Harris, 1 Strobhart, 160; Wakefield vs. Ross, 5 Story, 16;
Norton vs. Ladd, 4 N. H. Rep. 444; Butts vs. Swartout,'2 Cowen, 431; 15 Mass. 184.
Though Prof. Greenleaf and Mr. Phillips (1 Gr. Ev. 868; 1 Ph. Ev. p. 10, 11)
speaks of "infidels" as being incompetent in certain cases, yet, however much so
,irrational and abhorrent a belief might detract from a "credibility," I find no late
authority, nor does the true import of the term suggest any legalreason for regarding
it as aground of "incompetency." •
3 1 Atk. 21, 40, 42; Cowp. 389; Peake Ev. 138, (5 ed.); Lachin vs. Sabine, 2
Stra. 1104; 1 Phillips Ev. 8, 9; Greenlf. Ev. 371.
'1 Phillips Ev. p. 11,12. The more proper time to make an inquiry is before the
oath is administered. 1 Greenlf. Er. 371.
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be asked the general question, whether an oath in any form is
binding upon his conscience.' If a witness has conscientious scruples about taking the oath in the customary form, he may take it in
any form binding upon his conscience; or he may make a solemn
religious asseveration-provided it embrace the substantial legal
2
requisites of an oath.
§ 11. It is not proper for the party seeking to show incompetency, to interrogate the person offered as a witness concerning his
religious faith or belief.3 Nor is the inquiry permitted even after
he has been sworn. It would be an unjustifiable scrutiny into the
state of his faith and conscience, hostile to the spirit of our institutions, and foreign to the purposes of judicial investigations. 4 The
party objecting must prove that the person offered as a witness has
previously expressed opinions which, if then entertained, would
render him incompetent.5 The law will then presume that these
declarations were sincere,6 and that the belief then disclosed remains
unchanged. 7 If the person offered has changed his belief since
making the declarations proved, the party offering him may prove
the subsequent declarations to that effect, when (if they involve or
I Phillips Ev. 12; 2 Brod. & Bing. 284; Greenleaf Ev. 371.
' Commonwealth vs. Burrell, 16 Pick. 154; 2d Part Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev., Supplement, p 1503; 1 Greenleaf Ev. 371; Mum's Case, 2 B. & B. 285;
Reg. vs. White, 1 Leach C. C. 430; 2 Taylor Evid. p. 918, 1014.
'Den vs. Vancleve, 2 Southard's R. (N. J.) p. 653.
United States vs. Kennedy et al, 3 McLean R. 175; American Jurist, 4 vol.
79, note; 1 Swift's Dig. 739; 5 Mason, 19; Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 284; 3 Bla.
Com. (369,) note 30, (Christian's ed.); 1 Law Rep. 347, 348; 2 Taylor on Evid.,
92, 93, 1020. (The two last authorities show that our practice has been changed
in England.) 1 Phillips Evid. 11; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 370.
5 Smith vs. Coffin, 6 Shepley, 157; Swift's Ev. 48; 1 Swift's Dig. 739; 1 Greenlf.
Ev. 370, and note (2); 1 Law Rep. 347, 348. (It seems such is now the practice
in England-2 Taylor on Ev. 923, 924, 1020 and notes-though it seems formerly
to have been otherwise-I Phillips Ev. 11.) Perhaps only recent declarations can
be proved. Brock vs. Milligan, 1 Wilcox, 126.
6 1 Law Rep. 847, 348; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 370, note (2); 2 Taylor Ev. 293, note to

1020.
- State vs. Stinson, 7 Law Rep. 383; Att'y Gen. vs. Parnther, 3 Bro. Chan. Cas.
443; Peaslee vs. Robbins, 3 Met. R. 164; Hix vs. Whittemore, 4 Met. It. 545;
1 Greenlf. Ev. J 370.
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give evidence of the requisite legal belief) a like presumption will
arise and establish his present incompetency.'
§ 12. (II.) Of Incompetency from immaturity of mind. There is
no age at which the law conclusively presumes the mind of an infant
to be so immature as not to have sufficient understanding to be a
competent witness. 2 On the other hand, the law raises no presump3
tion of competency until the child arrive at the age of fourteen.
In such a case an examination of the intelligence of the child should
be made at the discretion 4 of the court and the decisive test of
competency, is its ability to comprehend the nature and effect of an
oath.5 The court has power to postpone a trial until an infant has
been instructed in the nature and effect of an oath.'
§ 13. (III.) Of Incompetency from derangement or weakness of
mind. As no Person can be heard as a witness unless he has the
7
ability to comprehend the nature and feel the sanction of an oath,
such ability in this case, as in the case of infancy, is the decisive
test of competency." While such ability is wanting, whether it be
tempdrary or permanent, whether it have aiisen from insanity,9 or
I Atwood vs. Wilton, 7 Conn. 66; Swifts Ev. 48-50; 3 BIa. Com. 369, Christian's
note; Commonwealth vs. Bachelor, 4 Am. Jurist, 79, note; Taylor on Ev,, vol. 2,
p. 923, 1020 and note (d) ; Greenlf. Ev. 370 and notes; 1 Law Rep. 347, 348.
And it would seem from the above authorities, that however recent may have been
the change of the witness' mind, he cannot be admitted to declare it, by reason, as
it is said, of the great danger of fraud.
2 1 Phillips Ev. 5; 1 East's P. C. 443; 4 Bla. Com. 214; 1 Leach C. C. 199;
R. vs. Perkin, 2 Moody C. C. 139; 2 Taylor Ev. 920; Greenlf. Ev. 367.
3 Taylor Ev. 920. But then such presumption exists. Den vs. Vancleve, 2
Southard R. 672; Jackson vs. Gridley, 16 Johns. R. 98; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 377.
4 If the court is requested to examine a young child, it must do so, and it is not
proper for the court to refuse by saying it is satisfied. The People vs. McNair, 21
Wend. 608.
f Taylor on Evid. 920; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 367; 1 Phillips Ev. 5.
6 Authorities cited in last note. McNally Ev. 154; It. vs. Wade, 1 Moody
'C. C. 86 ; (as to adult, see same cases and authorities.) But see Rex vs. Williams,
7 C. & P. 320.
7 See authorities cited in note to 8, ante, and 1 Greenlf. Ev. 364.
8 Authorities cited in note to 12, ante, and I Greenlf. Ev. 3365; 1 Phillips
Ev. 4.5. But see Snyder vs. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295.
9
Armstrong vs. Simmons, 3 Harriug. 343.
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lunacy, or idiocy,' or intoxication,' or any other cause, the person
so deficient is incompetent to be a witness.3
§ 14. It seems to have been formerly held that persons deaf and
dumb from birth were idiots, and wholly incompetent ;4 and though
the law raises no presumption of competency in their favor, it yet
devolves upon the party offering such person as a witness the burden of showing that he possesses the requisite intelligence and
understanding to comprehend the nature and effects of an oath.'
This having been made to appear, if by writing or signs, or through
an interpreter, or if by any method he is able to make himself understood, his testimony will be received.'
§ 15. (IV.) Of Incompetency from Infamy. There are certain
heinous offences which, in the estimation of the common law, demonstrate in him who shall be guilty of them the existence of such a
degree of moral turpitude as to render it improbable that even
under the solemn sanction of an oath, he would utter the truth.7
When a person having committed any such crime, is offered as a
witness in a suit between third persons,' he may be objected to;
I Supplement to 2d Part Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev. 1502; 1st Part ib.,
note 47 to 52, pp. 60, 61.
IHartford vs. Palmer, 16 Johns. 103. The court decides whether the degree of
intoxication is sufficient to render the witness incompetent. Gould vs. Crawford,
2 Barr, 89. A person being judicially declared a drunkard, does not raise a presumption of incompetency, as does an inquisition of lunacy. Gibhart vs. Shindle,
15 Serg. & R. 235.
3 1 Phillips Ev. 45; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 365; 1 Starkie Er. 91, .92; Livingston vs.
Kinsted, 10 Johns. 362; Evans vs. Hettich, 7 Wheat. 453; Tait on Ev. 342, 343;
Clarke vs. The State, 12 Ohio, 483. But the witness himself is not examined as to
his idiocy. Robinson vs. Dana, 16 Vt. R. 474. Other evidence should be given.
4 1 Co. Litt. 247, a; I Hale's P. C. 34; 1 Phillips Ev. 4.
5 1 Greenlf. Ev. 366; 1 Phillips Ev. 4.
6 1 Phillips Ev. 4; 2 Taylor on Ev. 919, 920,
1015; 1 Russ. on Crimes, p. 7;
1 Hale's P. C. 34; Morrison vs. Lennard, 3 C. & P. 127; Tait Ev. 343; 1 Leach
C. C. 455, (Ruskin's case;) State vs. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93; Snyder vs. Nations, 5
Blackf. 295.
'Gilbert Ev. 143, (4th ed.); Purdock vs. Malkin, Willes, 667; 1 Greenlf. Ev.
372, but see Rex vs. Teal, 11 East, 311, per Ld. Ellenborough, and I Phillips
Er. 14, 15, 16.
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and upon proof of his conviction by the production of the record
(or in proper cases by an authenticated copy of it)2 of the judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction which tricd him, 3 he will be held
incompetent by reason of infamy.' The record is properly required
as the sole evidence of this species of incompetency, from the manifest danger and injustice of stigmatizing any person as infamous
from general report, which might be false ; from the mere verdict of
a jury, which might be set aside; or upon any less conclusive evidence than the record of the solemn judgment of guilt, by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a trial to which the person offered
was or might have been a party.' The record of a judgment of
outlawry for treason or felony, will have the same effect as a judgment by confession. 6
I In a suit between third persons, he is universally incompetent. In re Sawyer,
2 Ad. & Ell. 721, (N. S.); 1 Phillips Ev. 19; 1 Salk. 461; 1 Greenif. Ev. 374,
372. But when he is a party he may make an affidaTit in his own exculpation, or
in self-defence, in certain cases. 2 Salk. 461; R. vs. Gardiner, 2 Burr. 1117;
Cowp. 382; Skinner vs. Perot, 1 Asbm. 67; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 374. See 2 Stra. 1148.
2 Hitts vs. Colvier, 14 Johns. 182; Com. vs: Green, 17 Mass. R. 537.
' 8 East, 78; 1 Phillips Ev. 19, 20; Lord Lovat's case, 9 State Tr. 652-655; S. C.
18 How. St. Tr. 1001-1011; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 372.
4 The infamy arises not from the nature of the punishment, but from the nature
of the offence. Gilbert Ey. 277; Willes R. 666; R. vs. Ford, 2 Salk. 690; 1 Phillips Ev. 18; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 372; 1 Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev., note
58, p. 64; Supplement 2d Part do., 1503.
A recent English statute has abolished incompetency from infamy, (6 & 7 Vict.
oh. 85; 2 Taylor Ev. 869, 952,) except in cases of high treason and misprision of
treason. 2 Taylor Ev. 870, 954. But by common law, witnesses are competent,
though not compellable to testify to their own turpitude. R. vs. Teal, 11 East, 309;
5 Mod. 244; 7 Term, 601.
r R. vs. Caseinin, 8 East, 77; Lee vs. Gansell, Cowp. 8; Seaton vs. Bishop,
4 Burr. 2283; 1 Phillips Ev. 19; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 372; 6 Com. Dig. 354. Even
the person's own admission will not render him incompetent. R. vs. Hanks, I Dennis." C. C. 84.
6 3 Inst. 212; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 48,
22; Celie's case, L. Ray. R. 369;
1 Phillips Ev. 18; 1 Stark. Ev. 95, 96; Greenlf. Ev. 375. But an outlawry in a
personal ,action is no ground of incompetency. Co. Litt. 6b. ; 1 Phillips Ev. 18;
contra in Scotland; Tait Ev. 374. The policy of the rule has been questioned,
and not without reason. But a practical application of the rule is easily made. 1
Phillips Ev. 16.
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§ 16. There is a conflict of opinions upon the question whether
the judgment of a crime which, in the jurisdiction where pronounced,
would render the guilty person incompetent, shall render him incompetent in a foreign jurisdiction. It clearly might be produced
to effect the credibility of the witness.' But it may be inferred
from modern opinions, that, if the disqualification arise, not from
the law of nature, but from a penal statute, or a positive law of
the State where the judgment was rendered, it will not render the
person convicted incompetent, in any other jurisdiction; on the
ground apparently that penal enactments are limited in their application to the jurisdiction of the tribunals that enacted them.'
§ 17. Perhaps it is impossible to specify precisely the crimes
which by the common law are infamous in the sense which renders
the perpetrator incompetent to be a witness.' Felony and treason
are clearly included. 4 It is not all the crimes which in the Roman
law were classed under the head of crimen falsi, that renders a
person incompetent.' It would be useless and dangerous on this
point to venture further than the authorities have gone, which have
only declared forgery, 6 perjury, subornation of perjury,7 suppression
of testimony by bribery, or conspiracy to procure the absence of a
witness," or other conspiracy to accuse one of crime,9 and barratry."°
Com. vs. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 539, 549; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 576.
2 Com. vs. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 539, 559; State vs. Chandler, 3 Hawkes, 393.
3 Ultey vs. Merrick, 11 Met R. 302; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 17, 18; 1 Greenlf. Ev.
373; 2 Dods. R. 186, 'per Sir W. Scott; I Starkie Ev. 94, 95; Willes' Rep. 665.
4 Co. Lit. 6 b.; Com. Dig. Test. A. 5; 2 Stra. 833; 1 Phil. Ev. p. 17; 1 Greenlf. 373.
5 1 Phillips Ev. p. 17, 18; 1 Dods. Adm. R. 174; Crowther vs. Mosswood, 3
Stark. N. P. Cas. 21, per Lord Tenterden; I Cowen & Hill's Notes to 1 Phillips'
Evid. p. 64, note 58; Supplement to 2d part do, p. 1503. In the Roman law, the
crimen falsi included a large number of crimes, Cod. lib. 9, tit. 22; 1 Brown's
Civil and Adm. Law, p. 426; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 373, 2 Dods. 174. But see 2
Stark. N. P. Cas. 21.
62 Hale's P. C. 277; R. vs. D. 5 Mod. 74.
7 Buller N. P. 291; Co. Litt. 6 b.; Com. Dig. 353, Test. A. 5.
8 Clancy's case; Fortesc. Cr. R. 208; Bushnell vs. Barrett, Ry. & Mood. N. P. C. 434.
911 Co. Rep. 99 a; 2 H. P. C. 277; 2 Leach C. C. 496; (Ro Crosby) 2 Dods.
191; 1 Starkie Evid. 95.
10Ren vs. Ford, 2 Salk, 690; Bu]. N. P. 292. And see generally on this subject,
1 Phillips Evid. p. 16, 17, 18; 1 Greenleaf Evid. 373.
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The crime which will render a person infamous, and hence incompetent, is "1one which involves not the charge of falsehood merely, but
is one which injuriously affects the administration of justice by the
introduction of falsehood and fraud."' It is equally impossible to
specify crimes which are not infamous; but it has been decided
2
that procuring goods by false pretences is not.
§ 18. This species of incompetency may be removed in two ways:
1. By the production of the record of a judgment of reversal by a
competent tribunal, of the judgment creating the incompetencyor in proper cases by a duly authenticated copy thereof;3 or, 2.
By the production of the charter of pardon under the proper seal.4
But a pardon will only remove an incompetency which attaches to
one who is adjudged guilty of a crime infamous "according to the
principle of our common law."' For if the perpetrator of a crime
is made infamous "by the express words of a statute," it seems no
pardon can restore his competency. 6 Such an effect would be to
permit the pardoning power to nullify the express intent and act of
the legislative power.7
§ 19. The few words necessary to be said concerning accomplices
fall in as appropriately in this place, perhaps, as at any other. A
mere varticep8 criminis,8however great the turpitude of his crime,
1

So said by Shaw Ch. J. in Utley vs. Merrick, 11 Met. 302, when the subject was

much considered.
The language is adopted from the text of Prof. Greenleaf.
1 Greenlf. Ev. 373. But it must be confessed the rule'is sufficiently indefinite still,
and one of great intricacy and perhaps of no practical utility and of some mischief.
1 Phillips Ev. p. 15, 16. If a statute declare the perpetrator of a crime infamous,
it seems he will be incompetent. 1 Phillips Ev. p. 18; 1 Greenlf. Ev. note 7 to
373; 1 Gilbert Evid. Lofft, p. 256, 257.
2 Utley vs. Merrick, 11 Met. R. 302.
a U. S. vs. Jones, 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 451; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 377. Authorities
cited in the notes to 15 ante; 1 Phillips Evid. p. 20.
4 2 Wheeler a. Cas. 451 ; Coddington vs. Wilkins, Hob. R. 67, 82; Lord Ray, 39;
1 Phillips Ev. 21; Lord Warwick's case, 13 How. St. Tr. 1003.
r 2 H. P. C. 278 ; 2 Salk. 690; Hot's Rep. 185 ; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 378 ; People vs.
Pease, 3 Johns. Cases, 883; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 595, 596.
6 See authorities cited in note to 17, ante.
7Hawk. B. 2, c. 37,
45; 1 Phillips Evid. 21 ; Harg. Jurist arg. Tol. 2, p. 221;
Am. Jurist, vol. 11, p. 360, 362.
'3 So a mere particeps fraudis is competent, Aikin vs. Kilburn, 27 Maine, 262.
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and even though he be indicted, if he has not been put on trial with
his associates in guilt, is a competent witness in their favor.1 And
even if he has been so put on trial, if the evidence against him is
very slight, the court has authority, which it will generally exercise,
to direct a separate verdict as to him ;2 and upon his acquittal, he
will be a competent witness in favor of his associates. The judge
has also a discretion as to allowing an accomplice already under
indictment to testify for the government.3 Accomplices are frequently allowed to testify, from the impossibility of bringing the
more guilty to punishment without such evidence.' A jury may
well receive the testimony of an accomplice with great caution. 5
And in cases of felony, the late authorities seem to require "that,
there should be corroboratory proof that the prisoner actually par6
ticipated in the offence."
1 Phillips Ev. 26, 27, 80; Sorgur's Case, Kel. 17; 1 Hawk. P. C. 303; Willes,
243; 19 How. St. Tr. 373; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 379. For an analagous principle, sec
Headly vs. Call, 27 Maine, 35.
2 Rex vs. Fletcher, 1 Stra, 683; Regina vs. Lyons, 9 C. & P. 555; Regina vs. W.,
8 Ibid. 283; 1 Greenlf. Ev. N 363, 379; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 30.
3 The decision of the judge will have regard to whether he be a principal offender
or not, 1 Phillips Ev. 28, 29; The People vs. Whipple, 9 Cowen, 707; 1 Greenlf.
Evid. 379. If the State would call one of several defendants charged in the same
indictment, a nolleprosequi must be entered; when being thus discharged from the
record he will be competent. Rex vs. Sherman, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 163. If one thus
charged has been convicted and has paid his fine, (that being the only penalty,) he
will be competent for the others, 2 Starkie Evid. 9, 10; 2 Hale P. C. 280; Musson
vs. Fales, 16 Mass. 335; Townsend vs. Rush, 1 Conn. 267; Rex vs. Fletcher, 1 Stra.
633; and Pullen vs. The People, 1 Doug. 48, (Mich. R.)
4 1 Phillips Ev. p. 27, 28; 1 Greenlf. Evid.
379.
5 United States vs. Truax, 3 McLean's R. 224. "Conviction seldom takes place
upon the evidence of the accomplice merely," per McLean, J.; 3 McLean R. 224;
1 Phillips Ev. p. 31, 32; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 380.
6 "1The corroboration must be of some material part of his (the accomplice's)
relation. That which goes to prove directly or indirectly the offence charged and
not an immaterial fact merely." Per McLean, J.; in U. S. vs. Truax, 3 McLean's
R. 224. The language seems to have been much considered and the rule deliberately laid down. The cases on this intricate subject are numerous and the distinctions subtle. I can do no more than cite a few of them. Tongur's Case, 6 Howell's
St. Tr. 226; R. vs. Jones, 2 Campb. R. 132; R. vs. Noakes, &C. & P. 326; R. vs.
Neale, 7 do. 168; R. vs. Barnard, 1 C. & P. 88; 7 Term R. 609; R. vs. Moores,
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§ 20. A few words seem not inappropriate in this place as to the
competency of a person who has put his name to a negotiable instrument, to be admitted in a suit between other persons, to prove
the instrument originally void. Upon this question there is a conflict of authorities. The old English decisions,' and some of the
later American2 decisions, perhaps the preponderancy, deny such
competency,3 merely as being against a sound public policy, 4 but
later English decisions, overruling the older ones hold such party
a competent witness to impeach the instrument, in which they are
sustained by decisions in some of the American courts. 6 This closes
the first general division of our subject, and brings us to the consideration§ 21. Secondly. Of incoinpetency by reason of the relation the
person offered sustains to a person or party.interested, or to the
7*c. & P. 270; Com. vs. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397. And generally, loscoe's Crim. Ev.
p. 120; 2 StarkieEvid. p. 12; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 28 to 38; 1 Greenlf. Evid.
280,
281; 2 Taylor on Evd. p. 658, 659, 660; and see generally supplement to Cowen
& Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev. p. 1604 to 1512.
1 Walton vs. Shelley, 1 Term 296; 1 Phillips Evid. p. 89, 40.
2 Strictly this section is not within the scope of this dissertation, parties to notes
-whenexcluded, are excluded on grounds of publicpolicy. See ante, 4 4, note.
Appleton vs. Donaldson, 3 Barr, 381. This case and many others confine the
doctrine to instruments actually negotiated. Henderson vs. Anderson, 3 Howard
Sup. C. R. 73; Thayer vs. Crossman, 1 Metcf. 416 ; Hadduck vs. Wilmath, 5 N. H.
It. 187; Chandler vs. Morton, 5 Greenlf. 374. The authorities are too numerous
for my limits. They may be found carefully collected in a note to 1 Greenlf. Ev.

j 885.
4 So far as the decisions on this point turn upon grounds of public policy, they
can hardly be considered as within the scope of this dissertation. See note to 4,
ante. And perhaps they must rest wholly upon this ground.
5 Jordaine vs. Lashbrooke, 7 Term 601 ; 1 Phillips Ev. p. 40, 41. This case
is certainly supported by many analogies. 1 Phillips Ev. p. 40, 41 ; Rands vs. Thomas, 5 M. & S. 241; 6 East, 195; Tills vs. Grevet, 2 Ld. Ray, 1008; R. vs. Teal,
11 East 309; Howard vs. Shepley, 4 East, 180; Twambly vs. Henly, 4 Mass. R. 441.
6 Williams vs. Walbridge, 3 Wend. 415; Stafford vs. Rice, 5 Cowen, 23; Taylor
vs. Beck, 3 Randolf R. 316; Townsend vs. Bush, 1 Conn. 260; Knight vs. Packard,
? McCord, 71; Haines vs. Dennett, 11 N. H. 180. The same doctrine is held in
several other States. See 1 Greenlf. Evid., note to 4 365; Supplement to 2d part

Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips Evid. p. 1513; 1 Phillips Evid. p. 44; 1 Greenlf.
Evid. H 283, 284, 285; 2 Starkie Bvid. p. 189, note (A), Metef. Ed.; Trescott vs.
Davis, 4 Barb. N. Y. K. 496, 500.
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judgment to be rendered. A general remark made before' may be
here repeated, that under this head we shall pass under review persons whose incompetency is not strictly personal and general, as
were those which fell into our first division, but those whose incompetency originates in and is limited by a certain relation. And as
a general rule, at least in civil cases,' this relation produces incompetency only when it creates an interest "peeuniary " in its natur

5

in the result of the suit ;' for the law seems to reject persons inte.
rested in the result of suits, substantially on the ground that such

interest renders it improbable that, if admitted, they would utter
the truth ;5 but it does not lose sight of the impolicy and danger of
multiplying temptations to perjury.

6

Such being the relative and

impersonal character of this species of incompetency, it may be

removed by any act between the proper parties which has the legal
7
effect of extinguishing the interest upon which it is founded, and
under certain circumstances the competency of a person may be

restored by acts which do not strictly extinguish his interest, but
which the policy of the law, nevertheless, holds to have the effect
to render him competent. 8 We shall, therefore, under this second
' Ante,

3.

criminal cases there are doubtless some exceptions. The punishment, though
not pecuniary in its nature, may be considered as taking the place of a pecuniary
interest. The case of a husband or wife in some instances may constitute an
exception. See post. 29, note.
' 1 Starkie on Evid. 17, 18; Tait on Evid. 894; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 327; Phillips
Evid. 42, 43, 44, 45,46; -Worrell vs. Jones, 7 Bing. 896; Gilbert Evid. 116; 1
Greenlf. Evid. H 386, 405, 887; Bowman vs. Noyes, 12 N. H. R. 302; Hingsbury
vs. Smith, 13 N. H. R. 109; 2d part Sup. to Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phillips Ev.
1514 to 1521.
4 It is supposed that a party to a suit, a person who has a direct interest in the
suit, the person who has an interest in the record as evidence, and the wife or husband, when the other is a party, at least so far as they are held incompetent in the
strict sense of the word, (and so far as they are excluded on grounds of public policy
they are not embraced in the design of this dissertation,) may be said to be interested "in the result of the suit."
5 Gilbert Ev. 122; 1 Phillips Evid. 41 to 44 ; ante, 4, note; 1 Greenlf.
Evid. a 329, 326, 327, 386; Flint vs. Stephenson, 6 Bing. 493.
6 Greenlf. Evid. 386; Stein vs. Bowman, 13 Pet. U. S. R. 209.
657, 68.
7 Post.
8 Post.
57, 58, 62.
2 In
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.general division, treat of persons incompetent-i, from a relation
as party creating an interest in the suit; 2, from a relation not as
party creating an interest1 in the suit ; 3, from a relation creating
an interest in the record of the judgment to be rendered in the suit;
"4, from a relation as husband or -wife of one of the parties or persons interested, 2 creating an interest in the suit.' Of these in their.
order.
It may be thought inaccurate to use the word "interest" in this connection,
since there are high authoritiei that hold, that, even if the pairty has no interest,
still he is inadmissible as a witness, (except for the opposite party.) Bridges-eg al.
vs. Armour, 5 Howard's U. S. R. 91. But it is conceived, and the case just cited so
affirms, that the party is excluded not because "incompetent" in the strict legal
sense, (see ante,
4, note), but because "inadmissible on grounds of public
policy." See also Stein vs. Bowman, 13 Pet. U. S. Rep. 209. Though not strictly
within the scope of this dissertation, it may not be improper, as bearing incidentally upon "incompetency," to cite some authorities as to the admissibility of a
party to the record not interested. By the civil law he is not admissible, Cod. lib. 4,
tit. 20, 1-10. So, under our peculiar modifications belonging to Chancery pro.ceedings, is the rule in equity. Gass vs. Tracy, 1 P. Williams, 290, 3 Lev. 18Q;
Mann vs. Wood, 2 Atk. 229. By the common law, as administered in England, be
is competent. Worrell vs. Jones, 7 Bing. 398, 399, per Tindell, Ch. 3., 1 Phillips
*Evid. p. 45 to 48, but see p. 52. Mr. Phillips is very definite, but I have been
unable to find anything definite upon the point in 1st Greenleaf's work, a 362, 386,
887, 347, 333, 356, 361, 329. These sections, in their general reasoning, will
*entirely warrant the inference that he thought such parties admissible, nor does
.note (4) to J 356 seem to contradict this opinion as a general proposition. I do not
find that he has even cited the cases in which this question is discussed. But it is
conceived that in this country parties to the record are not admissible, (except for
the opposite party and by, their own consent,) though they have no interest in the
suit, and this on the ground of publicpolicy. Bridges vs. Armour et al., 5 Howard's
•S. C. 91 ; Stein vs. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209 ; Abbott vs. Clarke, 19 Vt. Rep. 444 ; Day
vs. Cummings, ibid. 496; Evans vs. Gibbs, 6 Humph. 405; 2 Phillips Ev.i C..&
-H. notes, part 1,p. 134; "Pettinger vs. Keys, 2 Barr, 459; Sohus vs. McCullock, 5
Barr, 473, (but see Smith vs. Edder,.7 S. &M. 507;) see Paine vs. Tilden, 20 Vt.
5P3, 564; 18 Conn. 19; 15 ibid. 187, 205; 12 ibid. 134.
2 Abbott vs. Clarke, 19 Vt. Rep. 444; Pullen vs. The People, I Doug. (Mich.
R.) 48.
3 It may be remarked, generally, that persons incompetent from interest are competent to lay a foundation for secondary evidence. Jugan vs. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662;
3 Phillips Ev., C. & H. notes, 128-9, and also to make affidavits in certain cases.
1 Greenlf. Evid. 370, n. 375, 348, 349, 358, 344; post. 35, note.
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§ 22. (I.) Of incomptency from a relation as party creating an
interest in the suit.' It is a general rule of the common law that a
party to the record, having an interest2 in the-result of the suit, is
not a competent witness, s and the incompetency prevails, however
small the interest,4 even though it be no more than a liability for
costs.' And hence an executor, trustee, or any one in a like situation, will ordinarily be incompetent, 6 he being liable in the first instance for costs. Partly upon the ground of interest and :partly
upon the ground of public policy, (in the common law application
of the maxim, "1nemo tenetur seipeumn prodere,") a party to the
record in trials by j'Wy cannot be compelled to give evidence for
his adversary, and against himself, whether in civil or criminal suits, 7
and the rule will protect all such parties to the action, though not
zso named in the record.8 If a party consent to be examined, under
' This species of incompetency is abolished in England by recent statute.

Lord

Denman's Act, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 85; 2 Taylor on Evid., p. 868 to 870.
2 This rule has its exceptions, (see
53, 54, post.) but applies generally.
1 Phillips Ev. pp. 46, 47; Doe vs. Torth, 3 Yonnge, J., 19; B. vs. H., 5 Term, 174.
s1 Phillips Ev., p. 41 ; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 827 ; I Gilbert Evid. by Lofft, 228.
4It has been said that a witness is universally presumed competent, (ante, 6,
note), but perhaps a party would be presumed incompetent, even where held competent, if he be proved to have an interst. Cotchett vs. Dixon, 4 McCord, 311.
r 1 Phillips Ev., p. 47; Dodeswell vs. Nott, 2 Vernon, 457; 18 Price, 518;
1 Greenlf. Evid.
847; Ferson vs. Sanger, 1 Wood. & M. 138; Hopkinson
vs. Guildhall, 19 Vt. (4 Wash.) 538, but see Birt vs. Kershaw, 2 East, 460; see
post. U 87, 48.
6 Hopkins vs. Neal,'2 Stra. 1025; St. M. Magdalen vs. Burmondsey, 8 East, 7;
•Gresley Evid. 242, 243, 244; Goodtitle vs. Wellford, 1 Doug. 139; Frear vs. Everton, 20 Johns. 142; Fox vs. Adams, 16 Mass. 118, but see Fletcher vs. Greenwell, 5 Tyrw. 816. But these are exceptions, where the party liable for costs has a
clear remedy over.
'1 Phillips Evid. 59, 60; Com. vs. Marsh, 10 Pick. 57; Worrell vs. Jones, 7
Bing. 395; Mont vs. Mainwariig, 8 Taunt. 189 ; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 320, 853 ; Cummins vs. Coffin, 7 Iredell, .196.
8 Heasey vs. W. F. B. S. Co., 1 Doug. (Mich. R.) 193; Rex vs. Woban, 10 East,
395; Appleton vs. Boyd, 7 Mass. 181; Mamaw vs. Lamb, 7 Cowen, 174; 1 Phillips E. 60, note 1. It is conceived that when a person is competent to testify on
one side, he may be compelled to testify for the other, and vice versa. But see
post. j 27.
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certain circumstances to be explained hereafter,' he is a competent
witness; but a mere nominal party must obtain the consent of the
real party in interest.L2 Whether one or two co-parties may, without the consent of his co-parties, become a witness for the opposite
party, has been a matter of doubt, but it seems that modern authorities hold that he may not.3
§ 23. In Chancery, an important exception prevails to the rule of
law making parties incompetent. There a plaintiff may obtain an
order to examine a defendant, as may a defendant to examine a codefendant, upon certain terms and conditions not necessary here to
be mentioned; but a defendant has generally no corresponding right
to examine a plaintiff.
§ 24. When and how far thie rule of incompetency applies to the
incorporators when the corporation is a party, is sometimes a question not easy to decide.5 For the purpose of perspicuity and convenience, corporations may be classified under three heads : 1. Corporations for private emolument; 2. Corporations for charitable or
religious purposes; 8. Municipal corporations.
§ 25. Of corporations for private emolument, such as banks, insurance and manufacturing companies, membership is voluntary,
and'usually arises by a purchase of stock, and the interest is vested
and pecuniary, the same as any other private property. Yet, from
the organization of these bodies, it is the corporation strictly, and
not any individual member, that. is the party.' It follows, thereSee ante, j 22, note.
People vs. Irving, 1 Wend. 20.
2 Starkie Evid. 680, note r ; Scott vs. Lloyd, 12 Pet. 149 ; 1 Grenlf. Ev.
854, notes i and e. But see 1 Phillips Evid. 60, and City Bank of Baltimore vs.
Bateman, 7 Har. & Johns. 104; Cummins vs. Coffin, 7 Iredell, I96. See contra,
Miner vs. Downer, 20 Ver. R. 467, and the late cases from the Conn. R. cited in
note to paragraph 22, ante, which seem to lay down a doctrine which would sustan
'the rule in the 20th of Vermont R.
' 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. n. 1, 459, 848, 844; Gresley on Evid. 242, 244; Wilson vs.
McDonald, 6 Johns. 0h. Rep. 201; 2 Danl. Ch. Pr. 455,456; Mussy vs. Shadwell,
2 Vesey & B. R. 401.
5 1 Phillips Ev. 46, 47, 48; 1 Greelf. id. j 881.
6 2 Phillips Evid. 46; 1 Greenlf. Evid. 382, 883. Mr. Phillips, at the page cited,
2 The
3

dods not lay down the rule that the individual members are net parties, but he says
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fore, that the members or stockholders are not incompetent for the
corporation on the ground of being parties to the record,1 but nevertheless, they are incompetent for the reason that they have a direct
2
and certain interest in the result of the suit.

§ 26. (2.) Of corporations for charitable or religious purposes.
In these cases, membership is usually conferred by special election,
and the member has no private interest in the funds,3 the whole
being a trust for certain prescribed purposes; nor are the members
parties to the suit brought by or against the corporation, 4 and consequently they are competent witnesses. So a mere trustee of a
savings' bank, or a trustee of a society for the instruction of seamen,
or of any eleemosynary corporation, if not liable for costs,' is a com6
petent witness.
that the "same principles which render parties to the record incompetent, apply to members of a corporation suing in its corporate name.;" and he says
distinctly that the "objection to the competency of a party to the suit is founded
not upon the abstract ground of being a party, (see ante, 21, note), but upon the
ground of being interested." 1 Phillips Evid. 47. It is quite obvious that this language leads to the same conclusion I have stated in the text. Prof. Greenleaf
chooses to lay down the doctrine as to incompetency of a member of a corporation
on the ground of being a party to the record in a negative form. I Greenlf. Evid.
333.
2 1 Phillips Ev.47, 48; Merchants' Bank vs. Cook, 4 Pick. 405; Steward vs.
Huntingdon Bank, 11 Serg. & R. 267; Fairfield Co. P. Comp. vs. Thorp, 13 Conn.
173; City Bank vs. Bateman, 7 Har. & Johns. 104-109. But see Bank of 0. vs.
Houlton, 8 Shepley, 501. But later decisions sustain the doctrine of the text.
Hasey vs. W. P. B. S. Co. 1 Doug. (Mich. R.) 193.
2 Farmers and Mech. Bank vs. Champlain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. R. 131; Hasey vs.
W. P. B. S. Co, 1 Doug. (Mich. R.) 193; Porter vs. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410;
Cowen & Hill's Phillips' Evid., 3d vol. 1541, 1542, 1552; Davis vs. Morgan, 1 Tyrw.
457; Hovey vs. The Mill.Dam Foundry, 21 Pick. 453; but see Meadham vs. Law,
12 M. & W., 560.. But a member may be called upon to produce corporation documents; though incompetent, Rex vs. Ins. Co. of Wetherthomy, 2 M. & S. 237. A strict
pursuit of any plan would have required this subject to be treated elsewhere, but
-it was thought preferable to discuss the whole subject of corporations in the same
connection.
25, note.
'Ante,
3 1 Greenlf. Evid. 832.
a R. vs. St. M. Magdelen, 3 East, 7.
6 Cowen & Hill's Phillips' Evid., 3d voL 1542, 1543, 1552 ; Mariners' Church v.
Miller. 7 Greenleaf, 51; Gilpin vs. Vincent, 9 Johns. 219; Middletown Bank vs.
,Bates, 11 Conn. 519.
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§ 2T. (3.) Of municipal corporations. This class of corporations
is sometimes called public corporations. They are no more than
quasi corporations, not aiming so much to confer "private rights as
to regulate the manner of performing public duties."' Counties,
towns, boroughs, and the like, are examples of them, and the members, whose competency is in questi6n, are all the inhabitants of
these respective divisions, 2 or at least so many as are liable to pay
taxes.' It is worthy of observation, with respect to these corporati6ns, that they are dreated or remodeled, and the rights, relations
and intdrests of the-members changed by the legislature with little
necessary regard to the individual wishes of the members themselves.." And although the inhabitants are parties to the suits by
or against the corporation; and although they may be arrested, and
their private property sold on execution againt the corporation,
and their admission5 though of very trifling weight,5 may be given
in evidence ;6 yet, from the important considerations just mentioned;
from the extreme minuteness of each individual's private interest and
its contingent character; from the public character of the suits, and
from the great obstacles that the strict enforcement of the general
rule as to interested witnesses would throw in the way of public
justice, the members of municipal corporations are held competent
I Peck vs. the Freeholders of Essex, 1 Spencer's (N. J.) R. 417. The language
of the court seems in this case, as I have observed to be the fact in many other late
cases, to have been adopted from the accurate and luminous page of Prof. Greenleaf. 1 Greenleaf's Evid. 331. *Though Nevius, J., dissented, and the opinion
of the majority of the court was overruled in the appellate tribunal, yet the point

to which the case is cited was not overruled, and the case is valuablefor a thorough
discussion of general principles. Lunt vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 51; Dart. College
vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 629, 633 ; Angel &Ames on Corp. 16, 17; Bumford
vs. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
21 Phillips Ev. 47, 48; 1 Greenlf. Evid, 175.
3 1 Phillips Ev. 48; R. vs. Addubury, 5 Ad. & EL 187, (N. S.); 1 Greenleaf's
Ev. 175; Com. vs. Baird, 4 S. & R. 141 ; Bloodgood vs. Jamaica, 12 Johns, 285;
1 Phillips Ev. 138, 144.
4 1 Greenleaf Ev.
331.
5 2 Starkie Ev. 580; 11 East, 586.
6 Rex vs. Hardwick, 11 East, 579; 1 Greenleaf Ev. 175; 2 Starkie Ev. 280;
I Greenleaf Ev. 331.
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witnesses "in cases in which the rights and liabilities of the corporation only are in controversy."' It would seem reasonable that
'when a member is a competent witness for a corporation, he might
be compelled to testify for the opposite party; but perhaps this
cannot yet be said to be the law.2 But if the inhabitants have a
direct personal interest in suits to which the corporation is a party,
they are not competent to sustain their own interest.3
§ 28. Here it may be well perhaps to take notice of some rules
of law and usages of courts, which seem rather to avoid or qualify
the general rule of incompetency applicable to parties. If at the
close of a plaintiff's case,- there is one defendant, against whom no
evidence has been gi'en, and he is a material witness for the other
defendants, the jury will be directed to find a separate verdict in his
favor; and the suit being thus ended, as to him, he is a competent
witness for the co-defendants. 5 In such a case, the law seems to
presume he was made a party for the -purpose of excluding his
testimony;6 but if there is any testimony against him, the facts
must go to the jury; the judge in such case having no discretion to
direct a verdict in his favor. 7 So, if a plaintiff in trespass should,
' Peck vs. Freeholders of Essex, 1 Spencer's (N. J ) R. 457; Cowen & Hill's
Notes to Phillips' Ev., notes 116, 126,237,240; also Supplement to 2d vol. ibid. p.
1541 to 1543 ; 1 Greenlf. E.v. 175, n. 6, 331 p. 478, (3d ed ) n. 1. In the books
referred to, the numerous authorities are cited and commented upon.
2Rex vs. Woburn, 10 East, 395; R. vs. Hardwick, 11 ib. 578; Plattekell vs.
Newpatty, 15 Johns, 305.
3 Odlorne vs. Wade, 8 Pick, 578; Peeker vs. Mitchell, 11 Ad. & Ell. 788; Gould
vs. James, 6 Cowen, 369 ; Peck vs. Freeholders of-Essex, 1 Spencer, 457; R. vs.
Mayor of London, 2 Lev. 231. But this incompetency is in England removed by
statute 3 and 4 Will. 4, ch. 42, 26; in 2 Taylor on Ev. 867, 950.
4It is difficult to say how far the doctrine of this section will apply in actions
upon contracts. See 1 Phillips Evidence, p. 56, 57, note 4, and 1 Greenleaf Evid.
358, and note 1, where the learned authors indicate a decided opinion that the
same principles will apply to actions on contract.
5
Phillips Ev. p. 56, 57; Bate vs. Russell, 1 Mo. & Malk. 332; Child vs. Chamberlin, 6 C. & P. 218. The judge has a wide discretion in these cases. Brotherton vs.
Livingston, 3 W. & Serg. 334.
61 Gilbert Evidence, 117; Bull. N. P. 285; 1 Phillips Ev. 55, 56; 1 Greenlf. Ev.

? 358.
7 1 Phillips Ev. 57, and authorities cited in last note; Van Dewsen vs. Van Slick,
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by mistake, make one of his own witnesses a defendant, even after
issue joined, the court, on motion, -will allow his name to be stricken
from the record, and thereby his competency will be restored.1
Under a like state of facts in a criminal information, the same end
may be obtained by entering a nolle prosequi.2 So, "if a material
witness for a defendant in an ejectment be made a defendant, he
may let judgment go by default, and be admitted as a witness for the
other defendants." 3
§ 29. Except when set aside by considerations of public policy,
the general rule rendering parties incompetent, applies as well to
criminal prosecutions as to civil cases.' Analagous exceptions to
those just adverted to also prevail. Hence, if the State would make
a defendant a witness he must be discharged from the record.5 If
no evidence has been exhibitdd against him, the other defendants
may have a verdict in his favor, as in civil cases, and then he will be
competent for them. 6 And if only insufficient evidence has been
15 Johns. 228; Brown vs. Howard, 14 Johns. 119; Brotherton vs. Livingston, 8 W.
& Berg. 884.
There are many qualifications belonging to this rule which the narrow limits of
this dissertation will permit me to do no more than refer to the subject fully discussed
in Phillips Evid 50 to 59 ; 1 Greenleaf Evid. 858 and notes.
I1Phillips Evidence, 68,69, 1 Bid. 441; Bull. N. P. 285.
1 Phillips Evidence, 58, 59, 54, 55, 56, Cases Temp. Hardw. 163; 1 Greenlf.
E.
359.
1 Phillips Ev. 59; 1 Greenleaf Ev. 360, where the qualifications belonging to the rule are stated.
' 1 Greenleaf Evidence, 862; Valance vs. King, 8 Barb. 548. In some criminal cases, where the person offered as a witness has been held incompetent, and in
which the punishment is by imprisonment, or other means not pecuniary, it might
be difficult to show any interest in the sense in which that word has been heretofore
defined. (Post. 21, note.) But it is conceived that in such criminal cases the
punishment, whatever may be its character, must be regarded as taking the place
and. having the legal effect of a "pecuniary interest" in civil cases.
sPullen vs. The People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 48; 2 Bull. N. P. 285; Cas. Temp.
Hardw. 163; Rex vs. Sherman, ibid. 803. There are various ways in which a defendant may be discharged.
See I Phillips Ev. 67, 68, 69; 1 Greenleaf Ev.
363 ; see Com. vs. Smith, 12 Met- 238.
6 1 Phillips Evid. 67, 68; H. P. C. 46,
98; Rex vs. Mut. of the Bounty, cit.
arg. 1 East, 312, 813.
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adduced against him, a separate verdict of acquittal may be entered
at the request of the prosecuting officer, who may then call him as
a witness against the other defendants.' So, if two or more be
jointly indicted, and the suit be at an end as to one by the rendition
of a final judgment, that one, at least, if the judgment be satisfied,
is competent for the others. 2 So in actions of tort, (there being no
contribution among wrong doers,) a defendant, who has suffered
judgment to go by default, if the plea set 'up by a co-defendant
operates solely as a personal discharge, 3 and if his testimony cannot
directly make for himself, is a competent witness for such co-defendant.1 It may be doubted, however, whether he can testify to
the amount of damages, they being usually assessed entire.5
§ 80. It is now well settled, though formerly a contrary rule was
held, that a record in a criminal prosecution cannot be used in- a
civil action, except to prove the mere fact of the adjudication, or a
judicial confession of guilt by the party indicted. 6 And, it is the
State, and not the prosecutor, usually so called, which is the real
party prosecuting. The prosecutor then is not incompetent on the
ground of being a party, 7 nor is he generally on the ground of having an interest in the suit. 8 But this subject will be again adverted
1 Phillips Evid. 67; 1 Greenleaf Evid. 363; R. v. Rowland, 1 Ry. & M. 410.
1 Phillips Ev. 66 to 69 ; Com. vs. Marsh, 10 Pick. 57 ; The People vs. Bill, 10
Johns. 95 ; Com. vs. Smith, 12 Met. 238. This case seems to hold.a doctrine somewhat more liberal, as one jointly indicted was allowed to testify before sentence on
the trial of the other. S~e 20 Vermont, 554, Paine vs. Tilden.
3 But if the plea set up by a co-defendant will affect the damages for which the
defaulted co-defendant will be liable, he will net be competent upon the trial of the
former. Bowman vs, Noyes, 12 N. Hamp. 302.
4 Hawksworth vs. Showler, 12 M. & W. 48; Chapman vs. Graves, 2 Campb. 44;
Com. vs. Marsh, 10 Pick. 57, 58; Paine vs. Tilden, 20 Vermont R. 554.
5 2 Tidd's Pr. 896; Nash vs. Smith, 1 C. & P. 577: Vinal vs. Banal, 18 Pick, 29.
6 1 Phillips Evid. 62; R. vs. Boston, 4 East, 472; 1 Starkie Evid. 234;
Com. vs. Snell, 3 Mass. 82; The People vs. Dean, 6 Cowen, 27; Furber vs. Hilliard,
2 N. ff. 487. In England, there was formerly an exception in the case of forgery,
which is now removed by 9 Geo. 4, ch. 32, 2.
362; 1 Phillips Ev. 61 to 63. Some apparent exceptions
7 1 Greenleaf Ev.
or qualifications will be hereafter considered. Post. 54.
8 Authorities last cited.
2
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to, under the head of "persons interested not as parties to the
suit." So much seemed necessary to be said as to avoiding the rule
as to parties.
§ 81. A few words are requisite as to certain qualifications of
that rule. (1.) A plaintiff in equity, inasmuch as he appeals to the
conscience of the defendant, is held to have thereby waived all objection to the competency of the defendant's -answer, so far as it is
strictly responsive to the bill; and therefore it is evidence for the
defendant. It may also be used. against him,1 unless he be an
2
infant, or a married woman answering jointly with her husband.
§ 82. (2.) A qualification exists in those cases where the oath
of a party taken diverso intuitu is admitted in his favor. Thus,
where.the originality of an invention was in dispute, and the
letters patent were in the case, the oath of the inventor, made
prior to the issuing of the papers, was permitted to be opposed
to the oath, of a vitness who denied the originality of the invention.3
§ 3. (3.) A qualification or exception is admitted in cases ii
which due execution of the law demands some evidence, and from
the nature of the case none can be had but that of a party. .
Cases where a statute can receive no execution unless upon the
oath of a party or person interested, are examples. The admission is allowable on grounds of public policy."
§ 34. (4.) The fourth qualification, perhaps, amounts also to
an exception. It is much in the nature of the oath, in litem,
'2 Story Eq. Jurisp. 1528; Clark vs. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 160..
Gresley Evid. 24.

2

3 Alden vs. Dewey, 1 Story's R. 836; Pettebone vs. Deringer, 4 Wash. R. 215;
Bull. N. P.14; Johnson vs. Browning, 6 Mod. 216.
'County vs. Leidy, 10 Barr, 46.
r, U: S. vs. Patterson, 8 McLean, 53, ibid. 299; U. S. vs. Murphy, 16 Pet. 203;
see post. J 84, note. 1 Phillips' Evid. 184 to 144. In the application of this
exception, bailors have been admitted in certain cases, to prove the contents of
trunks lost by the negligence of the bailees. See McGill vs. Rowland, 3 Barr, 451;
Clarke vs. Spence, 10 Watts, 835; Story Bail. 454, note; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 348,
and notes. The oath of the party in these cases is in the nature of the oath in litem
of the Roman Law Dig. lib. 4, tit. 9, .6, 1.
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of the Roman law, (but is not founded on the Praetor's Edict,)'
and prevails in certain cases where it has been already proved that
the party against whom it is offered, "has been guilty of some
fraud or other tortuous or unwarrantable act of intermeddling with
the complainant's goods, and no other evidence can be had of the
amount of damage."'2 The case where a party proved, aliunde,
the delivery of a trunk to a ship-master, that on the voyage he
broke open the trunk and rifled it of its contents, and his oath
was received to prove the contents, is an illustration of this exception.3 So the plaintiff was allowed to make oath to his damage,
in an action against a'bailiff, whom, in the service of an execution, he had proved to have embezzled a sum of money and to
have otherwise done great damage.4 So in an action against the
husband, upon a statute of Winton, the party robbed was a competent witness for himself.' Such evidence seems to be admitted
partly on the ground of odium against spoliation, and partly on
the ground that if the case of the injured party were not received,
he would be destitute of all remedy. 6
§ 35. There is still another qualification of the general rule
that parties are incompetent, which will hardly admit of satisfacI1
21

Greenleaf Evid. 350.
Greenleaf Evid.
348; Tait Evid. 280.

So where the statute gives a

person compensation for damage done by violence, as of a mob, the injured party
is competent "en neceisitaterei." County v3. Leidy, 10 Barr, 46.
Herman vs. Drinkwater, 1 Greenlf. 27; Sneider vs. Geiss, 1 Yeates, 34.
Childrens vs. Saxley, 1 Vernon, 207; 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 229, S. C.
5 Bull. N. P. 187, 289.
6 And in the application of the reasoning founded on the latter ground, the plaintiff being a bailor has been allowed to testify to the contents of his trunk, lost by
the carelessness of the bailee. McGill vs. Rowland, 3 Barr, 451; Clarke vs. Spence,
10 Watts, 335; Story on Bail. 454, note; David vs. Moore, 2 Watts & Serg, 220.
In addition to the Pennsylvania cases already cited, see County vs. Leidy, 10 Barr, 46,
which may be thought, perhaps, to limit somewhat the prior cases. Bingham vs.
Rogers, 6 Watts & Serg. 495. It may be thought not very obvious how the doctrine of the two latter cases is to be reconciled with that of the others. I Gilbert
on Evid, by Lofft, 244, 245. It is worthy of remark that all the above are Pennsylvania cases. Since the recent decision in Massachusetts, it may be doubted
whether those cases can be regarded as establishing the general rule they lay down.
Snow vs. E. R. Road Co. 12 Met. 44.

